Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for murder in the first degree but remanded for resentencing in accordance with Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District, 466 Mass. 655 (2013), holding that because Defendant was a juvenile at the time of the offense, resentencing was required.Defendant was sixteen years old when he shot and killed a fourteen year old boy. Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree. In accordance with Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 2, as the statute stood at the time of trial, Defendant was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that he was not entitled to relief on any of his allegations of error; and (2) pursuant to Diatchenko, held that Defendant should be resentenced so that he will be eligible for parole on his life sentence. View "Commonwealth v. Fernandes" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's resentence for charges related to a series of violent carjackings, which defendant actively participated in when he was fifteen-years old.The court concluded that defendant's punishment was carefully tailored and there was no Eighth Amendment violation. In this case, defendant's 52-year sentence did not violate Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212 (2016). The court rejected defendant's contention that his sentence amounts to a de facto life sentence, concluding that defendant would be released in his sixties, which allows him "a limited period of freedom."The court also concluded that defendant's 52-year sentence was procedurally reasonable where the district court discussed each of defendant's mitigating arguments; gave defendant some credit for his maturation in prison; and addressed defendant's concerns regarding sentence disparities. However, the district court also highlighted the brutal nature of the carjackings and murders. The court also concluded that the sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court imposed a sentence many years below the advisory Guidelines range; did not abuse its discretion by placing significant weight on the seriousness of defendant's offense; and weighed the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors. View "United States v. Friend" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in this juvenile sentencing case remanding for the trial judge to remedy a harmful Alleyne error through a "ministerial correction" of sentence for which the defendant "need not be present," holding that the remedy fell short of the de novo sentencing required by Williams v. State, 242 So. 3d 280 (Fla. 2018).At issue was the proper remedy for a harmful Alleyne error that occurs where, in sentencing a juvenile offender under Fla. Stat. 775.082(1)(b), the trial court enhances the sentence without a jury finding of the fact that authorizes the enhancement. In this case, Defendant, who committed two homicides, argued that he should be resentenced because the jury was not asked to find, and did not find, that he "actually killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill the victims," as required under section 775.082(1)(b)1. The Fourth District concluded that the trial court committed a harmful Alleyne error in resentencing Defendant and remanded for "ministerial correction" of Defendant's sentences, for which Defendant "need not be present[.]" The Supreme Court quashed the Fourth District's decision, holding that Defendant was entitled to the de novo resentencing required by Williams. View "Puzio v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Jackson sought a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051 as a result of his conviction in 1998 that included two counts of first-degree murder with multiple special circumstances, which counts resulted in a sentence of two consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). Defendant was 19 years old when he committed the homicides. In his October 2019 motion, defendant argued section 3051 violated his equal protection rights because he allegedly “is entitled to the same protections as any other person who violated the law at the same age whether it was murder without special circumstances, robbery, kidnapping or any other crime.” The trial court in November 2019 denied the motion, finding that defendant was statutorily ineligible for relief and that there was a rational basis for carving out from section 3051 offenders such as defendant who were convicted of first-degree special circumstance murder and sentenced to LWOP. On appeal, defendant reiterated his trial court argument that section 3051’s exclusion of persons over 18 years of age with LWOP sentences from its parole hearing provisions violated the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. Upon de novo review, the Court of Appeal concluded the carve out to section 3051 for offenders such as defendant serving a LWOP sentence for special circumstance murder was not an equal protection violation. View "California v. Jackson" on Justia Law

J.J. was alleged to have committed forcible lewd conduct with a minor. The juvenile court declared him incompetent to stand trial, suspended the delinquency proceedings, and ordered remediation services in juvenile hall. After 12 months, the court found that J.J. still had not attained competency. Although the maximum period for remediation under Welfare and Institutions Code section 709 is 12 months, the court ordered his continued confinement pending finalization of an exit order and post-release services to assist his reentry into the community. Section 709(h)(5)(C) allows confinement of certain juveniles for up to 18 months if “necessary and in the best interests of the minor and the public’s safety.”The court of appeal held that the juvenile court lacked authority to order J.J.'s continued confinement beyond the remediation period for a purpose other than restoration to competency, which would potentially violate his due process rights. Once the court determined that J.J. had not attained competency at the end of the statutory remediation period, no further confinement could be ordered given the record in J.J.’s case. The purpose of section 709 is to protect a minor from juvenile proceedings during incompetency and to provide remediation services with the goal of restoring the minor to competence. Section 709(h)(5) does not permit the involuntary confinement of a minor beyond the statutory remediation period for the purpose of arranging postrelease services that are not designed to restore competency. View "J.J. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendant Malcolm Brewer and codefendants Glen Conway and Shane Williams participated in a string of armed robberies and attempted robberies, mostly of gas stations and convenience stores, in November and December 2017. In many of the robberies and attempted robberies, defendant personally used a firearm by displaying it to or pointing it at the victims. Defendant and his codefendants were charged in a 20-count amended information with numerous counts of robbery and attempted robbery with firearm enhancement allegations as well as one count of felon in possession of a firearm. Williams entered into a plea agreement. Defendant and Conway proceeded to trial together before separate juries. Defendant’s jury found him guilty of 11 counts of second degree robbery, two counts of attempted second degree robbery, and one count of felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court sentenced defendant, who had a strike prior, to an aggregate determinate term of 63 years. On appeal, defendant characterized his sentence as the functional equivalent of a life sentence without parole imposed on a developmentally disabled person, and contended it was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of federal and California Constitutions. The Court of Appeal rejected defendant’s contention that such a sentence categorically violated those constitutional provisions in the same way as imposition of the death penalty as to developmentally disabled adults and imposition of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) as to juvenile defendants. Accordingly, his convictions and sentence were affirmed. View "California v. Brewer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court quashed the Second District Court of Appeal's decision holding, in pertinent part, that the trial court erred in failing to notify J.A.R. of his asserted right to a hearing to challenge the $100 public defender fee imposed at sentencing, holding that the Second District erred in striking the public defender's fee.The trial court adjudicated J.A.R. delinquent for committing two felonies and a misdemeanor. In addition, the court imposed a $100 public defender fee under Fla. Stat. 938.29 without apprising J.A.R. of the fee or informing him of the right to a hearing to contest the fee. The Second District struck the fee on the grounds that the trial court did not give J.A.R. notice of his right to a hearing to contest the fee. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that since the $100 public defender fee was the statutory minimum under section 938.29(1)(a), the trial court was not required to provide notice and hearing as to that fee. View "State v. J.A.R." on Justia Law

Dequan Holmes appealed his convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime for the shooting death of Javares Alston and the non-fatal shooting of Danielle Willingham. He argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to convict him and that the trial court committed plain error when it charged the jury to “consider with great care and caution” Holmes’s out-of-court statements. Holmes, a juvenile at the time the crime was committed, also challenged his sentence of life without parole, arguing that it violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. The Georgia Supreme Court held the evidence was sufficient to convict Holmes and that any error in the trial court’s instruction to the jury did not amount to plain error because the instruction did not affect the outcome of his trial. The Supreme Court also concluded Holmes’ sentence of life without parole was not prohibited by United States Supreme Court precedent, especially in the light of that Court’s recent decision in Jones v. Mississippi, ____ U.S. ___ (141 S.Ct 1307 (2021)). View "Holmes v. Georgia" on Justia Law

A minor convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) argued that the statute that excluded misdemeanor traffic violations from juvenile court jurisdiction violated her right to equal protection under the Alaska Constitution. She argued that the mandatory jail sentence for first DUI offenders was unfairly different than the dispositions for other misdemeanors in the juvenile code. And she argued that it was unfair for felony DUI offenses to be charged in juvenile court when misdemeanor offenses were not. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded that because driving was an adult activity, the legislature could reasonably decide to treat misdemeanor traffic violations consistently to promote public safety while also reasonably choosing to protect juvenile offenders from the harsh collateral consequences of a felony conviction. The Court, therefore, concluded the statute was constitutional and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Watson v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Appellant N.A. was a nonminor former dependent (NFD). While a minor, she lived with a legal guardian, who received financial aid (aid to families with dependent children-foster care, or AFDC-FC) on N.A.’s behalf. When N.A. was 17 years old, she moved out of the guardian’s home. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency was not informed of this circumstance, and AFDC-FC payments to the guardian continued past N.A.’s 18th birthday. The guardian provided some financial support to N.A. after she moved out, but at some point, the guardian stopped providing support altogether. Thereafter, N.A. petitioned to return to juvenile court jurisdiction and foster care, which would provide her with certain services and financial aid, under Welfare & Institutions Code section 388.1. At that time, the Agency became aware of N.A.’s prior living circumstance and determined that she and the guardian became ineligible for AFDC-FC payments when N.A. moved out of the guardian’s home before N.A. turned 18. The Agency sent notice of its decision to the guardian. Based on its determination that N.A. was not actually eligible to receive AFDC-FC payments after she turned 18, the Agency recommended denying her petition for reentry. The juvenile court denied N.A.’s petition for reentry, but ordered the Agency to notify N.A. directly of its eligibility determination so that she could pursue administrative remedies. On appeal, N.A. contended the juvenile court’s order was based on an erroneous interpretation of section 388.1 and related statutes. Alternatively, N.A. argued that the court should have decided the AFDC-FC eligibility issue because exhausting the administrative hearing process would be futile under the circumstances. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the order. View "In re N.A." on Justia Law