Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

A married couple with a young child became involved in a physical altercation at their home, during which the father, while intoxicated, struck the mother multiple times. During the incident, the mother was holding their infant son, and the father accidentally hit the child in the face, though the child was not injured. The mother sustained injuries, including a lacerated lip and a cut foot. The police responded, and the father was arrested for domestic violence and child endangerment. Both parents later gave conflicting accounts to social workers, with the mother initially reporting prior incidents of domestic violence, including while she was pregnant or breastfeeding, but later recanting some statements. The father admitted to slapping the mother but denied hitting the child or prior violence.The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services filed a dependency petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), alleging risk of harm to the child due to domestic violence and the father’s substance abuse. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County detained the child from the father, released him to the mother, and ordered services for both parents. At the combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the court found the mother’s initial statements credible, sustained the domestic violence and substance abuse allegations, declared the child a dependent, and removed him from the father’s custody.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that substantial evidence supported the jurisdictional findings under both subdivisions (a) and (b) based on the parents’ history of domestic violence in the child’s presence, including the incident where the father accidentally struck the child. The court also found substantial evidence supported the removal order, given the ongoing risk and the parents’ lack of accountability. The appellate court affirmed the juvenile court’s findings and orders. View "In re Miguel J." on Justia Law

After the birth of A.M., the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services became involved due to concerns about the mother’s substance abuse and the father’s alleged failure to protect A.M. from the mother. The juvenile court initially placed A.M. with her father, who lived with his sister Martha and other family members, and later awarded him sole physical custody. Years later, the father was incarcerated after police found a gun and pills in his car. Before going to prison, he arranged for Martha to care for A.M., providing her with necessary documents and a notarized letter for temporary custody. However, when the mother learned of the father’s incarceration, she refused to return A.M. to Martha after a visit. The mother’s care was found to be inadequate, with evidence of substance abuse, neglect, and unsafe living conditions, leading to A.M. being placed back with Martha.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County detained A.M. from both parents, citing concerns about the father’s criminal history and the mother’s conduct. The court found that the father’s incarceration and criminal actions impaired his ability to parent and protect A.M., and removed A.M. from both parents under various provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code. Both A.M.’s counsel and the father’s counsel argued that the father had made an appropriate care plan, but the court disagreed and ordered removal.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. It held that a juvenile court may not remove a child from an incarcerated parent solely due to incarceration if the parent has made a suitable plan for the child’s care. The court found no substantial evidence that the father’s plan posed a risk to A.M. and reversed the portion of the order removing A.M. from her father, remanding for further proceedings as appropriate. View "In re A.M." on Justia Law

The case concerns a family in Evanston, Wyoming, where the State intervened after a five-day-old infant, SP, was hospitalized with a cerebral hemorrhage. Law enforcement took SP and three other minor children into protective custody, suspecting abuse or neglect by their parents, particularly focusing on the father, who is hearing-impaired and sometimes requires an ASL interpreter. The State filed a petition alleging abuse, and both parents initially denied the allegations. The children were placed in the custody of the Department of Family Services, and a permanency plan for family reunification with the mother was adopted.The District Court of Uinta County held several hearings, ensuring the father had access to an interpreter and legal counsel. During the proceedings, concerns about the father’s competency arose, but no formal motion for a competency evaluation was made. The father ultimately stipulated to the adjudication of neglect after being advised of his rights and confirming his understanding and voluntariness. Later, the father’s counsel sought to withdraw, citing communication difficulties, but the court denied the motion, finding no extraordinary circumstances. When the father was incarcerated out of state, the court attempted to facilitate his participation in the disposition hearing, but he could only appear by phone, which was ineffective due to his hearing impairment. The court proceeded, denied the father’s motion to dismiss, and ordered the children to remain in state custody.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decisions. The Court held that deficiencies in the neglect petition did not deprive the juvenile court of subject matter jurisdiction, that a parent in neglect proceedings does not have a due process right to a competency evaluation, and that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying counsel’s withdrawal. The Court also found no due process violation in proceeding with the disposition hearing without the father’s physical presence, given the circumstances and his representation by counsel. View "In the Interest of SP v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

Gregory D. is the father of X.D., a child born in 2014. In 2015, Gregory D. kidnapped X.D. and her mother, assaulted the mother, and endangered X.D., leading to a prior dependency proceeding in which the mother was granted full custody and the father was allowed monitored visits, though he rarely exercised them. In December 2023, X.D.’s mother was killed during a violent incident, leaving X.D. without a parent to care for her. At that time, Gregory D. was incarcerated and had not been in contact with X.D. for years. X.D. was placed with her maternal grandmother.The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services filed a petition in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County seeking dependency jurisdiction over X.D. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), citing the absence of a parent able to provide care. After Gregory D.’s whereabouts were discovered, he suggested his mother and brother as possible caregivers. The Department investigated and found the paternal grandmother’s home unsuitable due to her health and living conditions, and the paternal uncle was unresponsive and already caring for two young children. X.D. expressed fear of her father and no interest in living with his relatives.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that dependency jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (g), is appropriate when an incarcerated parent cannot arrange for suitable, reliable, or appropriate care for the child, even if the parent suggests relatives who are unwilling or unable to provide such care. The court affirmed the juvenile court’s order exerting dependency jurisdiction over X.D. and ordering reunification services for Gregory D. View "In re X.D." on Justia Law

Police received reports of a group committing robberies or attempted robberies in a white Nissan Rogue that had been reported stolen. Officers tracked the vehicle, observed it being driven recklessly, and saw it crash. Four individuals, including E.A., fled from the car. E.A. was apprehended shortly after the crash, frisked, and found to have a handgun in his sweatshirt pocket. He was subsequently charged with carrying a pistol without a license and possession of an unregistered firearm.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied E.A.’s motion to suppress the handgun, finding that officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop and frisk him based on his association with the group suspected of recent robberies and the stolen vehicle, as well as his flight from the crash. The court also concluded that, even if the officers’ actions exceeded the scope of a Terry stop, they had probable cause to arrest E.A. for multiple offenses, justifying a search incident to arrest. E.A. was adjudicated delinquent on both firearms charges and appealed, challenging the denial of his suppression motion.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop and frisk E.A., relying on the collective knowledge from radio dispatches, corroborated by officers’ observations and the circumstances of the stop. The court further held that the officers’ use of handcuffs and drawn weapons did not convert the stop into an arrest, given the safety concerns and flight risk. Therefore, the search and seizure of the handgun did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and the judgment was affirmed. View "In re E.A." on Justia Law

A child was removed from her parents’ care shortly after birth due to concerns about neglect. The mother, who has cognitive disabilities, was unable to provide basic care, resulting in the child’s hospitalization for weight loss. The father, who also has an intellectual disability, did not live with the mother and child and was unable to take custody when the child was discharged from the hospital. Both parents were found responsible for neglect, and the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) was awarded legal custody. The parents were ordered to meet certain conditions, including maintaining safe housing, engaging with mental health providers, and participating in parenting education, while DCYF was required to provide supportive services.The Circuit Court–Concord Family Division held periodic review hearings, finding the parents in only partial compliance with the orders. The mother struggled to care for the child outside of supervised settings and failed to secure appropriate housing. The father also lacked housing and did not fully engage with required services. After twelve months, the court determined that neither parent had corrected the conditions leading to the neglect finding and established adoption as the permanency plan. DCYF then petitioned to terminate both parents’ rights. The trial court granted the petitions, finding that DCYF made reasonable efforts to assist both parents and that termination was in the child’s best interest.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that non-compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) cannot be asserted as a defense in a termination of parental rights proceeding. The court also found that the evidence supported the trial court’s findings regarding the mother’s failure to correct the neglect conditions, DCYF’s reasonable efforts, and the determination that termination was in the child’s best interest. The orders terminating parental rights were affirmed. View "In re K.O." on Justia Law

In this case, a juvenile defendant was implicated in a home invasion and rape that occurred in Methuen, Massachusetts, in November 2018. The victim identified three intruders, and subsequent investigation led to the defendant’s arrest. After his arrest, police obtained a DNA sample from the defendant via a warrantless buccal swab, which the Commonwealth later conceded was unlawful. The resulting DNA evidence was suppressed. However, after the defendant was indicted as a youthful offender, the Commonwealth, relying on evidence independent of the suppressed DNA, successfully moved for a court order compelling a second, postindictment buccal swab. DNA evidence from this second swab was admitted at trial.The Essex County Division of the Juvenile Court Department initially heard the case. The judge suppressed the first DNA sample but granted the Commonwealth’s motion to compel the second sample, finding probable cause based on evidence unrelated to the initial, unlawful swab. At trial, the defendant was convicted by a jury of aggravated rape and other offenses. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment and probation. The defendant appealed, challenging both the order compelling the second DNA sample and the jury instructions regarding “serious bodily injury” as an element of aggravated rape. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts transferred the case from the Appeals Court for review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the second, court-ordered buccal swab was lawfully obtained based on independent probable cause and was not tainted by the prior illegality, so the DNA evidence was properly admitted. The Court also found no error in the jury instructions. However, because the general verdict did not specify which aggravating theory the jury relied on, and only one theory was supported by sufficient evidence, the aggravated rape conviction was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Commonwealth v. Carvajal" on Justia Law

Three children were removed from their mother’s care after reports of neglect, substance abuse, and domestic violence. Two of the children, C.V.I. and C.J.J.I., are considered “Indian children” under federal and state law due to their tribal affiliations, while the third, R.A.R., is not. The Department of Children, Youth, and Families sought and obtained orders for out-of-home placement and later filed dependency petitions. The children spent several months in foster care while the court process unfolded, with the Department offering various services to the mother and involving the relevant tribe.The Spokane County Superior Court (juvenile court) held a fact-finding hearing and found the children dependent but ruled that whether the Department made “active efforts” to prevent the breakup of the Indian family was a dispositional issue, not required at the dependency stage. The court ordered the children to remain in out-of-home care until disposition. At the subsequent disposition hearing, the court found that the Department had made active efforts and continued the children’s out-of-home placement. The mother appealed, arguing that the Department was required to prove “active efforts” at the dependency hearing. The Washington Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the juvenile court erred by not making an “active efforts” finding at the dependency hearing, and remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. It held that when a child is placed outside the home, the juvenile court must find that the Department made “active efforts” to prevent the breakup of the Indian family before entering an order of dependency. If such findings are not made, the dependency and dispositional orders must be vacated, and the children must be returned to their parent unless doing so would subject them to substantial and immediate danger or threat of such danger. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "In re Dependency of C.J.J.I." on Justia Law

A 17-year-old defendant was charged with ten serious offenses, including murder and assault, after a violent confrontation at the home of his rivals. The incident stemmed from a feud with a classmate and escalated when the defendant, accompanied by his family, armed himself and attacked the victims’ home. The attack resulted in the death of one individual and severe injuries to others. The defendant, an enrolled member of the Cherokee Nation, was charged under federal law for crimes committed within the Cherokee Nation Indian Reservation.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma first reviewed the case. The government moved to transfer the defendant from juvenile to adult criminal proceedings under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act. After an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge recommended granting the transfer, and the district court adopted this recommendation after conducting a de novo review. The district court weighed the statutory factors, including the defendant’s age, social background, psychological maturity, prior delinquency record, past treatment efforts, and the availability of rehabilitative programs, and found that most factors favored transfer to adult status.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the statutory transfer factors and found no clear error in its factual findings. The court also rejected the defendant’s Eighth Amendment argument that transfer was unconstitutional due to the potential punishments, holding that the challenge was unripe under circuit precedent. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order transferring the defendant to adult criminal proceedings. View "United States v. J.D.V., Jr." on Justia Law

The case concerns two young siblings, E.H. and R.H., whose parents brought E.H., a three-week-old infant, to the hospital with a fractured arm. Medical examinations revealed multiple acute fractures on E.H.’s body, which doctors concluded were caused by nonaccidental trauma, likely from shaking or similar abuse. Both parents denied any knowledge of how the injuries occurred and provided no plausible explanation. They were E.H.’s sole caretakers, and there was no evidence that anyone else had access to the child. The Department of Social Services (DSS) intervened, taking both E.H. and his older brother R.H. into custody.The District Court of New Hanover County adjudicated E.H. as abused and neglected and R.H. as neglected, finding that the parents’ inability to explain E.H.’s injuries and refusal to accept responsibility created an injurious environment for both children. The court found that, given the parents’ lack of accountability, there was a substantial risk of similar harm to R.H. The parents appealed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals unanimously upheld the adjudication for E.H. but, in a divided opinion, vacated the neglect adjudication for R.H., reasoning that the trial court relied solely on E.H.’s abuse without specific findings predictive of probable neglect for R.H. The majority remanded for further findings, while the dissent argued the trial court’s findings were sufficient.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision regarding R.H. The Supreme Court held that when a child is severely abused and the parents cannot plausibly explain the injuries or assure that abuse will not recur, a trial court may find that other children in the home are at substantial risk and thus neglected. The Court also emphasized that appellate courts should not address issues not raised by the parties. The adjudication of R.H. as neglected was reinstated. View "In re E.H. & R.H." on Justia Law