Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of first-degree murder, one count of attempted first-degree murder, and one count of aggravated arson, holding that no error occurred in the proceedings below.Defendant was fourteen years old when he committed the crimes for which he was convicted. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the court's certification to try him as an adult violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not err when it denied Defendant's motion to suppress incriminating statements Defendant made to police; (2) there was no prosecutorial error; (3) Defendant's Apprendi issue was unpreserved for appeal; (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying Kan. Stat. Ann. 38-2347(e) and authorizing adult prosecution; and (5) the court abused its discretion in applying the factors set out in K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 38- 2347(e) to authorize a juvenile's adult prosecution. View "State v. Vonachen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate R.B. delinquent, holding that the timing requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 2152.84 are not jurisdictional.The juvenile court adjudicated R.B. delinquent, classified him as a sex offender, and imposed a disposition that included probation. After a second sex-offender-classification hearing the juvenile court kept R.B.'s classification the same. R.B. appealed, arguing that the juvenile court was required to hold the review hearing and and issue its decision on the precise day his disposition ended and because the juvenile court did not do so, it lost jurisdiction to continue his classification. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the language "upon completion of the disposition" found in section 2152.84(A)(1) requires only that the court's review take place within a "reasonable time" of the juvenile's completion of his disposition; and (2) section 2151.23(A)(15) vests the juvenile court with jurisdiction to carry out its requirements under the classification statutes, independent of whether the delinquent child has reached the age of twenty-one. View "In re R.B." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant D.H. (minor) had a history of defiant and criminal behavior, resulting in him being placed on formal probation in two juvenile delinquency matters. Throughout his probationary period, D.H. violated the law and the terms and conditions of his probation. While still on probation, the juvenile court dismissed the Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petitions and terminated D.H.'s probation as unsuccessfully completed based on a joint request from the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) and the probation department to transfer jurisdiction to the dependency court under section 300. D.H. requested the juvenile court seal his section 602 juvenile delinquency records, and the juvenile court denied his request. On appeal, D.H. argued the juvenile court was required to seal his records under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786 (e). Alternatively, he contended the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his motion to seal his records under section 786(a). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re D.H." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's 55-year sentence imposed for his conviction of participating in a pattern of racketeering activity evidenced by his role in the murder of four teenagers. Defendant was 15 years old at the time of the offense and a member of the MS-13 gang when he participated in the execution-style murders of four members of a rival gang.The court assumed, for purposes of this appeal, that the district court was required to consider the factors in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), in determining that a sentence of 55 years, not subject to parole, was warranted for a defendant fifteen years old at the time of the homicide crimes. Even with this assumption, the court concluded that the district court considered the Miller factors and reasonably concluded that a further departure was not warranted. Acknowledging the broad scope of a sentencing judge's discretion and taking into account the care taken by the sentencing judge in exercising that discretion, the court concluded that defendant's sentence is not unreasonable in any legally cognizable sense. Finally, the court noted that defendant's sentence illustrates the unfortunate consequences of eliminating parole. Nevertheless, it is a sentence that a conscientious district judge concluded was appropriate and, upon review, the court affirmed. The court considered defendant's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. View "United States v. Portillo" on Justia Law

After receiving a citizen’s tip that Black males in a Mercedes were “acting shady,” four San Diego Police Department (SDPD) officers drove to the scene in two marked vehicles, activating emergency lights in one. Parking behind the Mercedes, the officers positioned themselves beside each of its four doors and asked the three teenagers inside for their names and identification. A records check later indicated that the driver was on probation subject to a Fourth Amendment waiver. The officers searched the vehicle and recovered a loaded firearm and sneakers linking the minors to a recent robbery. The minors moved to suppress the evidence found in the car, claiming their initial detention was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Finding the encounter was consensual rather than a detention, the juvenile court denied the motions. Two of the minors pleaded guilty to a subset of the charges originally filed. In a consolidated appeal, two of the minors, Edgerrin J. and Jamar D. challenged the denial of their motions to suppress, arguing the juvenile court erred in finding the encounter consensual, and claimed the citizen’s tip did not establish reasonable suspicion to detain them. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed on both points. However, the Court found conflicting evidence as to whether officers knew other facts that might furnish reasonable suspicion for the stop, or justify the detention and search pursuant to Edgerrin’s active Fourth Amendment waiver. Because the rationale for its ruling made it unnecessary for the juvenile court to address these other issues, judgment was reversed and remanded for a new hearing to permit it to assess witness credibility and reach factual findings in the first instance. View "In re Edgerrin J." on Justia Law

In January 2019, 15-year old Heather Juliano was a passenger in a sport-utility vehicle driven by Shakyla Soto in the vicinity of the Capital Green development in Dover, Delaware. Corporal Robert Barrett of the Dover Police Department was patrolling the area, accompanied by Probation Officer Rick Porter, as part of the Department’s Safe Streets program. Corporal Barrett spotted Soto’s SUV exiting Capital Green and noticed that the occupant of the front passenger seat was not wearing a seat belt. Corporal Barrett decided to pull the vehicle over. Almost immediately after Barrett initiated contact with the driver, he heard Porter say “1015 which means take . . . everybody into custody.” Three other Dover Police Department officers arrived on the scene in very short order. All four occupants of the SUV were removed from the vehicle and handcuffed in response to Porter’s order. The SUV was then searched, but no contraband was found. One officer searched backseat passenger Keenan Teat and found a knotted bag containing crack cocaine in one of his pants pockets. Another officer searched passenger Zion Saunders and found both marijuana and heroin in his jacket pockets. But when Officer Johnson searched Juliano, he found no contraband, but $245.00 in cash. Juliano was later taken to the police station, and strip-searched. Officers found marijuana and a bag of cocaine in her pants. Juliano was charged with Tier 1 possession of narcotics plus an aggravating factor (aggravated possession of cocaine), drug dealing, and possession of marijuana. The Delaware Supreme Court determined there was nothing unreasonable in a motor vehicle stop based on an officer's reasonable suspicion the operator or occupant of the vehicle committed a violation of the law - here, traffic laws. "Equally so, we are not prepared to say that, once a vehicle is lawfully stopped, the police must ignore evidence of other criminal activity when that evidence itself is lawfully uncovered." Rejecting Juliano's appellate claims with regard to the initial traffic stop and the suppression od evidence, the Supreme Court felt compelled to address "certain conspicuous irregularities" in the trial court's order denying Juliano's motion to suppress: (1) the trial court did not articulate a basis for finding a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the extension of the traffic stop to investigate the vehicle's occupants; and (2) the court's order did not explain the basis upon which the custodial arrest and threatened strip search were justified. The matter was remanded to the trial court for more complete statements of the factual and legal bases with respect to Juliano's search and subsequent arrest. View "Juliano v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of restitution entered by the separate juvenile court after Juvenile admitted to an amended allegation of disturbing the peace and quiet of another person, holding that the juvenile court had the authority to order restitution for medical expenses so long as such order was in the interest of the juvenile's reformation or rehabilitation.As a term of probation, the juvenile court ordered Juvenile to pay $500 in restitution for the victim's medical expenses. Juvenile court argued on appeal that the Nebraska Juvenile Code does not authorize a juvenile court to order restitution for medical expenses incurred by a victim. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of restitution for medical expenses, holding (1) Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-286(1)(a) authorized the juvenile court to order Juvenile to pay restitution for medical expenses; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Juvenile caused the victim's injuries and to support the amount of restitution ordered, and the order of restitution was in the interest of Juvenile's reformation and rehabilitation. View "In re Interest of Seth C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's maximum 138-year sentence imposed for crimes Defendant committed as a juvenile and revised the sentence to a total sentence of eighty-eight years, holding that the 138-year sentence was inappropriate.Defendant was seventeen years old when he and two others committed murder in 1991. Defendant received an aggregate sentence of 138 years, which was the maximum possible term-of-years sentence. In 2016, Defendant filed a verified petition for post-conviction relief challenging the propriety of his sentence in light of the fact that he was a juvenile when he committed the crimes. The post-conviction court granted the petition and imposed an aggregate sixty-eight-year sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the order granting relief and revisited its prior decision regarding the appropriateness of his sentence but revised the sentence to an aggregate term of eighty-eight years, holding (1) the doctrine of res judicata does not bar consideration of Defendant's appropriateness argument due to two major shifts in the law; and (2) Defendant's maximum term-of-years sentence imposed for crimes he committed as a juvenile was inappropriate. View "State v. Stidham" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting that the denial of a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051 violates his right to equal protection of the laws and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Petitioner, who was 21 years old at the time of the offense, was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and the jury found true the allegation that he personally used a firearm in the commission of the robbery. The jury also found true the special circumstance allegations that he committed multiple murders and murder during the commission of robbery. Petitioner was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP).The Court of Appeal held that the amendment to section 3051 did not provide any relief to petitioner who had committed an LWOP offense after he had attained 18 years of age. The court rejected petitioner's equal protection argument, disagreeing that youth offenders sentenced to LWOP and those youth offenders sentenced to parole-eligible life terms are similarly situated with respect to the Legislature's first goal, which is to calibrate sentences in accordance with youthful offenders' diminished culpability. Furthermore, even if the court assumed petitioner is similarly situated to non-LWOP indeterminately-sentenced youth offenders aged 18 to 25, the court still would find no equal protection violation. Finally, the court held that petitioner's LWOP sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. View "In re Williams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the juvenile court's adjudication of K.C.G. as a delinquent child for dangerously possessing a firearm, as well as its modification of K.C.G.'s probation based on that ruling, holding that the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.The delinquency petition here alleged that K.C.G., age sixteen, committed the offense of dangerous possession of a firearm. After a hearing, the juvenile court adjudicated him a delinquent and modified his probation. The Supreme Court vacated the adjudication, holding that the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the State's petition did not allege a jurisdictional prerequisite - that K.C.G.'s conduct was "an act that would be an offense if committed by an adult." View "K.C.G. v. State" on Justia Law